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Supreme Court Rules That Beef Check-Off

Is Government Speech;

But Check-Off Litigation May Not Be Over

-by Roger A. McEowen* 
Overview 
On May 23, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the federally-mandated beef promotion 
program against a First Amendment challenge on the basis that the program constituted 
government speech.1 The Court, however, left open the possibility that the beef check-off 
could be successfully challenged on First Amendment grounds if it can be shown on remand 
that the advertisements attribute their generic pro-beef message to the plaintiffs.2 As such, 
the Court’s ruling does not necessarily end the beef check-off litigation, and is not entirely 
precedential for the pork check-off litigation that awaits a determination as to whether the 
Supreme Court will hear the case.3 
The Statutory Framework 
The Beef Promotion and Research Act4 (Act) was passed by the Congress as part of the 
Food Security Act of 1985.5 Under the statute, the Secretary of Agriculture (Secretary) 
was directed to issue a Beef Promotion and Research Order (Order).6 The Act also directed 
the Secretary to appoint a Cattlemen’s Beef Promotion and Research Board (Board)7 which 
convened an Operating Committee (Committee) and imposed a $1 per-head assessment 
(the “check-off”)8 on all sales or importation of cattle, which is to be used to fund beef-
related projects, including promotional campaigns designed by the Committee and approved 
by the Secretary.9 
It is clear from the legislative history of the Act that the program was only intended as 
enabling legislation to establish an industry “self-help” program.10 
The Government Speech Issue 
The case involved (in the majority’s view) a narrow facial attack on whether the statutory 
language of the Act created an advertising program that could be classified as government 
speech. That was the only issue before the Court. While the government speech doctrine 
is relatively new and is not well-developed, prior Supreme Court opinions not involving 
agricultural commodity check-offs indicated that to constitute government speech, a check­
off must clear three hurdles -  (1) the government must exercise sufficient control over the 
content of the check-off to be deemed ultimately responsible for the message; (2) the 
source of the check-off assessments must come from a large, non-discrete group; and  (3) 
the central purpose of the check-off must be identified as the government’s.11 Based on 
that analysis, it was believed that the beef check-off would clear only the first and (perhaps) 
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the third hurdle, but that the program would fail to clear the 
second hurdle. Indeed, the source of funding for the beef check­
off comes from a discrete identifiable source (cattle producers) 
rather than a large, non-discrete group.  The point is that if the 
government can compel a targeted group of individuals to fund 
speech with which they do not agree, greater care is required to 
ensure political accountability as a democratic check against 
the compelled speech.12 That is less of a concern if the funding 
source is the taxpaying public which has access to the ballot 
box as a means of neutralizing the government program at issue 
and/or the politicians in support of the program.13 While the 
dissent focused on this point, arguing that the Act does not 
establish sufficient democratic checks,14 Justice Scalia, writing 
for the majority, opined that the compelled-subsidy analysis is 
unaffected by whether the funds for the promotions are raised 
by general taxes or through a targeted assessment.15 That 
effectively eliminates the second prong of the government speech 
test. The Court held that the other two requirements were 
satisfied inasmuch as the Act vests substantial control over the 
administration of the check-off and the content of the ads in the 
Secretary.16 
Unresolved Issue 
The court did not address (indeed, the issue was not before 
the court) whether the advertisements, most of which are credited 
to “America’s Beef Producers,” give the impression that the 
objecting cattlemen (or their organizations) endorse the message. 
Because the case only involved a facial challenge to the statutory 
language of the Act, the majority examined only the Act’s 
language and concluded that neither the statute nor the 
accompanying Order required attribution of the ads to 
“America’s Beef Producers” or to anyone else.  Thus, neither 
the statute nor the Order could be facially invalid on this theory. 
However, the Court noted that the record did not contain 
evidence from which the Court could determine whether the 
actual application of the check-off program resulted in the 
message of the ads being associated with the plaintiffs.17 Indeed, 
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, noted that the 
government may not associate individuals or organizations 
involuntarily with speech by attributing an unwanted message 
to them whether or not those individuals fund the speech and 
whether or not the message is under the government’s control.18 
Justice Thomas specifically noted that, on remand, the plaintiffs 
may be able to amend their complaint to assert an attribution 
claim which ultimately could result in the beef check-off being 
held unconstitutional.19 If those facts are developed on remand, 
and the ads are found to be attributable to the complaining 
ranchers or their associated groups, the beef check-off could 
still be held to be unconstitutional. 
Implications of the Decision 
It seems clear from the opinion that the Secretary now must 
take steps to affirmatively exercise the authority vested in the 
Secretary under the Act, and run the check-off as the government 
program the Court says it is.20 Likewise, organizations that 
purport to speak for ranchers must actually represent them – 
failure to do so, coupled with receipt of check-off dollars (or 
indirect benefit from check-off dollars), will bolster a 
constitutional claim by members of non-check-off recipient 
cattle organizations (who must pay the assessment) on freedom 
of association grounds.21 
The opinion is also not entirely precedential for the pending 
pork check-off litigation.22 That case involves not only a 
government speech issue, but also a freedom of association 
claim.23 Thus, the pork case24 contains a remaining open claim 
on the compelled association issue. 
The opinion may prove ultimately to not be that useful of a 
precedent on the government speech issue. Only four of the six 
justices that formed the majority in the case really believe that 
the beef ads constitute government speech. Justice Ginsburg 
concurred separately and stated that while she did not believe 
the beef ads amounted to government speech, the majority 
reached an adequate decision for the wrong reason. Justice 
Breyer also concurred separately and stated his continued belief 
that the beef check-off is a permissible form of economic 
regulation, but that the majority’s government speech theory 
was an acceptable solution 
In any event, the majority opinion would appear to expand 
the application of the government speech doctrine. Apparently 
it is no longer the rule that permissible compelled public support 
for speech is limited to situations where the government does 
not exercise control over the speech and takes a viewpoint-
neutral approach that lets private parties determine the content 
of the speech being supported. 
What remains clear is that check-off funds cannot be used to 
promote the check-off itself.25 
What’s Next? 
The Court remanded the case to the Federal District Court in 
South Dakota. The Livestock Marketing Association will have 
to decide whether it will continue the litigation on the ad 
attribution rationale suggested by Justice Thomas. Beyond that, 
it is difficult to determine why the Court seemingly expanded 
the government speech doctrine. Clearly, Justices Scalia, 
Thomas and Rehnquist (all part of the majority) are sympathetic 
to the government speech analysis in the context of abortion,26 
and they may have ruled as they did in the beef case to expand 
the government speech doctrine for application in a case they 
will decide next term involving a federal law27 (known as the 
Solomon Amendment) that removes federal funds from 
institutions of higher education that do not permit military 
recruiters on campus.28 That case has been positioned as a 
government speech case (among other claims), and in late 2004 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled 
that the Solomon Amendment was unconstitutional because it 
forced schools to agree with the government’s policy of allowing 
gays to serve in the military only if they do not openly declare 
their sexual orientation.29 
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 Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, noted that the 
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157 (6th Cir. 2003), aff’g sub nom., Michigan Pork Producers, et 
al. v. Campaign for Family Farms, et al., 229 F. Supp. 2d 772 
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
ANIMALS 
HORSES. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a 
stable hand and was injured while walking a horse in a barn as 
part of the plaintiff’s duties. The horse stepped on the plaintiff’s 
foot after being spooked by the barking of one of the defendant’s 
dogs. The plaintiff argued that the defendant was negligent in 
failing to properly restrain the dog. The court held that the 
defendant did not owe a duty to the plaintiff to restrain the dog 
because the existence of dogs and their interaction with horses 
was not an abnormally dangerous condition on a farm. In 
addition, the court noted that there was no evidence that the 
dog had any history of barking at the horses while the horses 
were in the barns. Rodriguez v. Gauger, 2005 Mich. App. 
LEXIS 1127 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
ADVERSE POSSESSION 
FENCE. The disputed strip of land was located on the 
plaintiff’s side of a fence but was part of the recorded land of 
the defendant. Both parties used their land for farming and the 
evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff used the disputed strip 
as part of the plaintiff’s farming operations, relying on the fence 
as the boundary line between the properties. The defendant 
argued, however, that the plaintiff’s use of the strip was 
permissive because the fence was built to accommodate the 
plaintiff’s cattle access to a pond.  The defendant also cited use 
of the disputed strip by the defendant and family for hunting 
and hiking. The trial court had granted summary judgment to 
the defendant based on the permissive use of the disputed land 
and the defendant’s use of the land. The appellate court reversed 
and remanded the case for trial, holding that the plaintiff had 
raised sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether 
the fence existed when the plaintiff’s father purchased the land, 
thus removing the possibility that the fence was built with the 
permission of the defendant. The court also rejected the claim 
that the defendant’s use of the disputed strip was sufficient to 
defeat the adverse possession claim, because the defendant’s 
use occurred after title would have passed by adverse 
possession. Wadsworth v. Thompson, 2005 Ala. Civ. App. 
LEXIS 257 (Ala. Ct. App. 2005). 
The disputed strip of land was located on the defendant’s 
side of a fence but was part of the recorded title for the 
plaintiff’s land. The defendant had leased the plaintiff’s land 
for many years from the previous owners of the plaintiff’s 
property. However, the defendant pointed to the previous 
owner’s use of the defendant’s land as including the disputed 
strip for sufficient time for title to pass by adverse possession. 
The court held that the defendant could claim title by adverse 
possession under the previous owner’s adverse use of the land 
up to the fence if the defendant had received title through 
written conveyances which indicated that the conveyance 
included the land up to the fence. The court held that the 
defendant’s claim was supported by sufficient evidence to raise 
an issue of fact to reverse the trial court’s summary judgment 
ruling for the plaintiff. Moser v. Batchelor, 2005 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 3702 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005). 
BANKRUPTCY 
GENERAL

EXEMPTIONS

EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT. The debtor claimed an 
exemption, under Ala. Code § 38-4-8, for a federal income tax 
refund which resulted from the earned income tax credit (EITC). 
The state exemption applied to amounts paid as public 
assistance. The court held that the EITC qualified as an amount 
paid as public assistance and allowed the exemption. In re 
James, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,367 (11th Cir. 
2005). 
